From Atrocity to Accountability
Genocidal Intent, State Responsibility and Fragmented Criminal Jurisdiction in The Rohingya Cases
Keywords:
Genocide, Rohingya, Myanmar, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, international criminal jurisdictionAbstract
The persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar has generated two legally distinct, yet mutually reinforcing, proceedings: The Gambia's claim against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court's (ICC) investigation of crimes with a territorial nexus to Bangladesh. This article asks whether the documented violence can satisfy the legal definition of genocide, how genocidal intent should be inferred without collapsing genocide into ethnic cleansing, and whether the existing accountability architecture can overcome jurisdictional and enforcement constraints. Using doctrinal analysis of the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute, international judgments and United Nations investigative materials, it advances a thesis of jurisdictional asymmetry: the ICJ may consider Myanmar's responsibility under the Genocide Convention across the relevant conduct, while the ICC's non-referral jurisdiction reaches only sufficiently connected conduct occurring at least partly on a State Party's territory. The evidence strongly supports serious allegations of genocidal acts, particularly killing, grave bodily or mental harm and destructive living conditions; proof of measures intended to prevent births requires more precise evidence. A definitive finding of genocidal intent remains for competent courts applying their respective legal standards. The article argues that evidentiary coordination, national prosecutions, survivor protection, and differentiated remedies are indispensable complements to international adjudication. It provides a legal framework for evaluating the Rohingya proceedings without prematurely treating investigative allegations or provisional measures as final judgments.

















